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Deconstruction and Aesthetics Extract
from an interview with Bernard Stiegler
Mick O’Hara: Professor Stiegler, could you
say a little about how the two concepts of
deconstruction and aesthetics affect and
operate within your own practice and if it is
possible to think them together? What, for
you, is the legacy of deconstruction? Bernard
Stiegler: As it was already stated by Derrida,
we need now to deconstruct deconstruction,
because I believe that deconstruction has
become a new construction. Not constructed
by Derrida himself, yet maybe with Derrida,
but mainly with ‘Derridianism’, there is a
new kind of construction. It is not only
the construction of deconstruction but the
construction of what is called poststructuralism. It is a problem of, let’s say, the
sixties and seventies and the relationship
between philosophy and politics, and
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between politics and economy, or political economy. My own obsessive
question with deconstruction and art is technics. And I personally believe
that the question of the relationship between technics an aesthetics during
the twentieth century is still not explicit or criticized. We have to criticize
this question today, but this has not yet happened. So my relationship to
the question of deconstruction and aesthetics is a political one, based on
the question of the status of technics in arts and in deconstruction and,
consequently, in politics.
Now to explain a little bit more about what I mean and to return to your
questions. I believe that we have arrived at what I call the proletarianisation
of sensibility and at the question of symbolic misery. To think this we
need deconstruction. Yet deconstruction is not sufficient. We need to pass
through deconstruction, which is a system of oppositions between form and
matter, logos and techne, but for me there is a problem with technics and
deconstruction. It was a complete misunderstanding between Derrida and
me when we discussed ‘What is technics?’ Because when I said that technics
is not only the supplement, because of this, because of that, etc., he replied
that it is a supplement, because of this, because of that, etc. Behind this, in
aesthetics, is the question of conceptual art, and materiality or immateriality,
and performance. I believe that for aesthetics these questions are extremely
important, particularly so for in what is called contemporary art. These
questions are at the centre of the practices and the questions of art.
Now, there is another question, which is the question of market, the art
market and speculation. How to avoid becoming speculative? We need to
be speculative but also to avoid becoming speculative in the sense of the
market. It is a problem for Derrida and for contemporary art too. I believe
that this is a question of political economy, and I will develop this later
this evening. But, for now, the question is one of proletarianisation. For
example, the question of reproducibility, which is opened by Derrida at
the beginning of his own work as the question of iterability. They are not
the same question, but for Derrida [the question of] reproducibility is first
and only that of iterability. In the sense of Husserl and phenomenology I
believe that for Benjamin, for example, the question of reproducibility is
not one of iterability. It is a question of proletarianisation—for the cinema
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actor, for example—and it is, for Benjamin, a Marxist question that extends
to the problem of perception, of symbols, and so on. For Derrida, however,
this is not a material question. The archi-trace is not material and is not
affected by the tradition of materialism in Derrida’s work. For me this a
problem. I tried to show in my recent book Etats de choc (2012), I tried to
read Marx’s Grundrisse and the famous chapter dedicated to the question of
automation. I tried to show that in this chapter the question is one of what I
call grammatisation. It is extremely clear because you can see that for Marx
[automation] is a process of abstraction, which is what I call grammatisation.
The original act is one of abstraction. This is the case even for Derrida
when, in Of Grammatology, he commented upon Speech and Gesture by
[André] Leroi-Gourhan, where the latter showed that at the beginning of
the high Palaeolithic period one finds the process of abstraction. And this
is a process of grammatization. Derrida tried to show that what he called
grammatology is based on what Leroi-Gourhan describes as the process of
the exteriorization of life into artificial and inorganic memory. For me, this
implies not a materialist question of grammatisation but what I call a hypermaterialist question of grammatisation. I say hyper-materialist in the sense,
not with Derrida but with [Gilbert] Simondon, where we can overcome
the opposition between form and matter. And to overcome this opposition
between form and matter is also allowed by grammatology, but not in the
same way.
But this hyper-materiality is a materiality. Why is it necessary to say that
it is materiality? It is necessary to explain that we cannot stay only in the
question of archi-trace or archi-writing. For me, these are artificial concepts.
It is extremely surprising for somebody claiming to inherit Derrida’s work
to say this, but it is what I think today. I think that the archi-trace is like
the transcendental in Deleuze. For me, it is a problem. You cannot say, for
example, that you have transcendental empiricism. It is not possible. You
are an empiricist or a transcendentalist, or you are something else but it is
not possible to be a transcendental empiricist. Absolutely impossible. So
for me this is typical of the problem of post-structuralism: with Derrida,
with the archi-trace; with Deleuze, with transcendental empiricism; and
it is also the problem, for example, between Lyotard and Heidegger and

phenomenology, when Lyotard repeats the critique of writing coming from
Heidegger. So I would say, to answer your question about the relationship
between deconstruction and aesthetics today, we need to rethink the
relationship between form and matter and to overcome these concepts. But
for that, personally, I need to transform the question of grammatology into
the question of grammatisation. Grammatology is a quasi-transcendental
structure, as explained by Derrida in his late work. Grammatisation is
not a structure. It is a process. So it is much closer to Hegel or Simondon
than to Husserl or Kant. It is a historical process, which is an empirical
process. Personally I define myself as an empiricist, but [it is not], let’s say, a
vulgar empiricism, because I believe that we need redefine completely the
relationship between “empiricity” and passing through epimethea. Which is
to transform the problem of empiricity into the question of experience. But
the experience of what? Of the artefact, of the accident, that which is not
just matter.
Perhaps I am now closer to Deleuze than to Derrida on this question,
because behind this question of epimethea there is the question of what
Deleuze calls quasi-causality, that is, the Stoic consideration of the accident,
of chance, of, let’s say, contingency. And the question of technics is one of
contingency, of the accident, of the artificial, of the artefact. So now coming
back to your question, I believe that today we must articulate aesthetics
and deconstruction into a critique of aesthetics and deconstruction in
the political point of view and in an economical point of view. I believe
that we have the same problem with deconstruction and arts, which is the
articulation to politics, [and] a bad articulation to economy. I say a bad
one, because we don’t have a good critique of speculation. I say critique of
speculation in the sense of Kant saying we must criticize the speculative
point of view of Leibniz, we must limit the status of philosophy. But it is
also a question for aesthetics and critique. Personally, I believe that it is
impossible to have something like aesthetics as a discipline on art without
a critique. But as you know this concept of critique is destroyed by Deleuze
and Derrida and all those people when they say judgement is not a question
today and deconstruction is not a total critique. I believe that we cannot
abandon the concept of critique. In Etats de choc, I wrote that it is not only
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a pure coincidence that makes Lyotard speak of the end of grand narratives
[at the same time that] Thatcher explains that ‘there is no alternative’. It is
the same statement, ultimately, and it is not at all a coincidence. It is a failure
of thinking, a failure of critical thought.
So I believe we have to re-invent critique and not[....] For Derrida,
critique was necessarily critique based on the privilege of the subject.
For me, critique is produced by the process of grammatization because
critique is firstly produced by the process of “discretisation”. To critique, or
to criticise, as you say, is necessarily to distinguish, that is to “discretise”,
and you have a lot of kinds of discretisation. You have a discretisation by
mathematics, of arithmetic, etc. But the sorcerer, for example, in a shamanic
society also produces a process of discretisation. It is not the same, but it is
what is at stake in the introduction The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life by Durkheim. In the introduction, Durkheim writes “The totem is a
process of categorization”, that is, of discretisation. So, I say that the totemic
organisation of society is a process or stage of grammatisation and such
stages of grammatisation are produced by what I call tertiary retention. The
totem is a tertiary retention. And when Derrida says that archi-writing is
instantiated by alphabetic writing in Greek society and it produces this and
that, etc., I believe that we must apprehend this question not only according
to the point of view of what Derrida calls a logic of the supplement but
according to the point of view of what I might call the history of the
supplement and what Derrida hiimself calls the history of the supplement.
But this history of the supplement is not only a grammatology, it is a
grammatisation. Grammatology is logic that is logocentric. Grammatisation
is not logic, it is a process. It is technical. It is “techno-logic”. Even if it is not
based on the subject, grammatology remains within logic. It is not a technologic.
So, here, there is a problem. Generally, Derridean scholars say that I
misinterpret Derrida by using grammatisation as the real and efficient
development of grammatology, because what I call grammatisation
is produced through the process of the exteriorization of life into
hominisation, into human life, and they make the objection that, for
Derrida, archi-writing is not at all anthropological. It concerns the whole
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of life, all walks of life. I agree with this, but I believe it is not possible to
have, this grammatological view of life without passing through the process
of grammatisation. To access, for example, the concepts of molecular
structures of life you need the microscope. You need all the concepts of
biology, and this is produced precisely by grammatisation. So, to access
grammatology you need to pass through grammatisation. It is exactly the
same situation that one finds in Zein und Zeit by Heidegger, who says that
you cannot access the question of Being without passing through the Dasein.
When he says that he has a phenomenological method for accessing the
question of Being, he says: I must start from the ‘there’ (Da). And what is
the ‘there’? It is an artefact of the historical, the Geschichte, the period in
which I am. So, you cannot begin with grammatology. You must begin with
grammatisation. In this sense, there is, for me, a kind of regression at the
end of the work of Derrida, which goes back to where Husserl says he needs
a quasi-transcendental. It is a kind of regression to Husserl. So, this is the
reason for which I said that we need to continue to think those questions
with deconstruction, but we also need to ‘deconstruct’ deconstruction. For
this deconstruction of deconstruction, we need a new concept of critique
that is not at all a grammatological critique but a grammatised critique and
a critique of grammatisation. A historical critique. This is the reason why
I say I am closer to Hegel and to Simondon but also to Nietzsche, because
I believe that this is what is at stake in Nietzsche. For example, the second
dissertation of the Genealogy of Morals is this question for me. Now, in
point of view of the relationship between aesthetics and deconstruction, this
means that we need to, that I need personally, to develop an organology of
aesthetics.
This interview was conducted on Thursday 19th January 2014 at the Dublin
Institute of Technology.
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